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Consumer Culture, Precarious Incomes and Mass Indebtedness 




In recent years, labour markets have been characterised by stagnant wages, reduced incomes 
and growing insecurity supplemented by the ongoing proliferation of outstanding payment 
obligations at almost all levels of economy and society. We draw upon current debates in 
social and economic theory to explore the disconnect between the deterioration of late 
capitalism’s distributive measures and the relative vitality of consumer cultures, suggesting 
that the latter relies substantially on immaterial, credit-based payment means to bridge the 
gap between the fundamental fantasy of ‘more and better’ and the decline of material 
productivity denoted by base rate of profit. We then use this disconnect as a breach-point for 
an in-depth interdisciplinary discussion of the substantive and ideological function of credit.    
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Western capitalism has changed markedly over the last few decades as the relatively durable 
and stable labour forms associated with its earlier industrial phase have all but disappeared, 
replaced by a threadbare patchwork of short-term, low-paid and on-demand contract work 
(see Lloyd, 2018; Friedman, 2014). In the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the US and 
across much of Continental Europe, this shift has significantly eroded the earning potential of 
a large section of the workforce as dependable employment has given way to radically 
insecure and hyper-competitive ‘gig economies’.  Wherever late capitalism touches ground, 
a large and growing section of the workforce – up to 1-in-3, in some cases (see, for example, 
Balaram & Wallace-Stevens, 2018) – extract very little benefit from it to the extent that they 
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routinely struggle to makes ends meet, have very limited capacity to save money and feel 
deeply insecure in their current employment. 
In this context, we might have expected consumer spending to drop off long before the Covid-
19 pandemic, falling victim to a host of deflationary pressures attached to the basic 
substructure of late capitalism, making its continued growth all the more remarkable as it 
assumes an increasingly inverted relationship with the fundamental uncertainty of income, 
labour and employment (see ONS, 2019). In other words, late capitalism has more or less 
succeeded in decoupling income from expenditure, buttressing economic growth against the 
decline of baseline output whilst nonetheless maintaining subjective identification.  
With this paper, we explore the tension between insecure, undependable labour markets and 
the endless solicitations of consumer cultures within the overall debt structure of late 
capitalism. We first outline the interplay between work and consumption, exploring the 
powerful forms of subjective identification that seem to emerge organically from structures 
and forces that might otherwise appear to be purely economic in nature. Second, we connect 
these consumer subjectivities with the marked proliferation of outstanding debt over the last 
forty years, considering the origins and functionality of borrowed payment means within an 
otherwise stagnant and illiquid form of capitalism. Finally, we push further into the structural 
foundations of 21st century consumerism to explore the long-run speculation at the heart of 
contemporary political-economy and the dissociation and structural cynicism common to 
prevailing socio-cultural contingencies. In so doing, we offer an original analytical synthesis of 
ongoing debates circulating around consumer cultures, socioeconomic uncertainties and 




Consumption and Employment 
Western capitalism has long relied on a degree of ‘conspicuous consumption’ (Veblen, 1994 
[1899]), the neoliberal era has markedly transformed the requisite distribution of payment 
means, maintaining the accelerated participation of the post-war decades whilst fostering 
substantial disparities of wealth and income (Piketty, 2014). The shift away from welfarist 
distributivism and the social-democratic ideal is well-rehearsed in the literature (Harvey, 
2010; Winlow and Hall, 2013), as is the adoption of a more ‘free market’ model (see Harvey, 
2005), but its effects are still playing out across the social structure. In the sphere of work and 
employment, for example, the clear, contractual relationships of decades past have given way 
to an on-demand, as-and-when employment model that has turned even the most banal of 
jobs into an incessant entrepreneurial grind that effectively requires constant, unceasing 
effort just to maintain minimum-waged piecework (Standing, 2011; Lloyd, 2018).  
Whilst an increasingly distant elite have withdrawn from place and community into a 
gloriously bacchanalian, resource-intensive isolation, everyday life under late capitalism 
cultivates a wide-ranging sense of impermanence and fragility as mere participation relies on 
fragmented and unpredictable labour markets. In the United Kingdom, the ‘gig economy’ had 
been the fastest growing section of the labour market for several years prior to the advent of 
Covid-19 – the pandemic has most likely accentuated extant trends in this regard (Briggs et 
al, 2021) – accounting for roughly five million people, all subject to a low-wage, high-stress 
employment model (Lloyd, 2018). What’s more, this trend is mirrored around the world with 
otherwise diverse employment markets in the Australia, Canada and the US all describing very 
similar trends as a growing section of each national population find their way into forms of 
work that, as Australia’s Parliamentary Committee on Education and Employment (EERC, 
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2017: 99) put it, come with “no security of income, no insurance… in case of accident, no 
superannuation, no personal, annual or paid leave of any description”.   
This is, arguably, the economic substrate of a divergent society, a shift from relative cohesion 
facilitated by a distributive approach to socioeconomic regulation to a growing gap between 
the pecuniary beneficiaries of neoliberal order and pretty much everybody else (Dorling, 
2015). Wherever we look, ‘inequality’ has become one of the standout features of the early 
21st century as a privileged few pull away from the rest, feeding the proliferation of mass 
resentment along with a host of negative socio-structural indicators. Whether it’s problems 
of mental or physical health (Bambra, 2016), educational failure, crime, antisocial behaviour 
(Ellis, 2019), indebtedness (Horsley, 2015) or growing levels of poverty and deprivation 
(Dorling, 2015), all connect into an increasingly divided and disaffected social field in which 
people collectively and individually seek solace and identification in other aspects of their 
lives, particularly the solicitous realm of consumer culture (Gilbert, 2013; Smith and Raymen, 
2018).  
Wages have been falling for decades, routinely outpaced by rising cost of living despite 
nominal increases in the near term (Streeck, 2016), outright ‘unemployment’ might have 
become a relatively small problem, but large and growing sections of the population are 
significantly ‘under-employed’ (Bell and Blanchflower, 2018) whilst nonetheless fully 
committed to consumer culture. Although access to disposable funds is under significant 
pressure, the socio-symbolic attachment to consumption remains, particularly in the field of 
identity, status and display (Bauman, 2005; 2007; 2012) where culture and leisure provide 
many of the primary building blocks for a cohesive, autonomous sense of self (Kotzé and 
Antonopoulos, 2021). In numerous empirical studies (see, for example, Winlow and Hall, 
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2009), attachment to consumer culture repeatedly proved to be an incredibly powerful and 
seductive force, offering innumerable opportunities to signal, if not flaunt, tastes, styles, 
personalities and, crucially, spending power.  Where the sphere of employment is riddled with 
uncertainty, fragmented and often completely purposeless (Graeber, 2018), consumption 
and leisure are deeply seductive, providing opportunities for enjoyment, exploration, 
reinvention and catharsis from the mundanity of everyday life that remain just as significant 
to late capitalism’s socio-structural vitality as they are to an individualised sense of purpose 
and fulfilment (Ellis et al, 2018).   
Although employment increasingly fails to provide any sense of stability, let alone a 
dependable income, consumption remains central to both late capitalism’s limited growth 
prospects and the individual motivations of subject population (Smith and Raymen, 2018). It 
remains a critical component of economy, culture and society even though it arguably runs 
counter to the material productivity of the underlying structural form to the extent that many 
otherwise engaged consumers might have struggled to maintain their allegiance to the 
competitive field of status and display without an additional source of payment means.  
In the absence of credit, much of the world economy would almost certainly have faced 
significant problems of effective demand (Langley, 2014; Horsley, 2015) as the steady erosion 
of employment-related income amidst the growing insecurity and undependability of work 
fed through into reduced consumer spending, ensuring a long socioeconomic depression that 
might well have taken historical trajectories in a very different direction. If nothing else, the 
likes of Francis Fukuyama (1992) probably could not have proclaimed the ‘end of history’ if 
the post-war beginnings of consumer capitalism had collapsed as soon as industrialism’s rate 
6 
 
of profit dropped off, going some way to making the liberal-democratic settlement as 
unattractive as its Soviet compatriot.  
For nearly four decades, the western world’s prevailing socioeconomic contingencies have 
been increasingly reliant on supplying consumers with means of payment through a near-
constant proliferation of outstanding personal debt, which, in the UK context, began to rise 
in the early 1980s as the comparatively low figure of £64 billion turned into the £1.5 trillion 
that almost crashed the national economy in 2007-8. After the financial crisis and amidst the 
beginnings of the austerity era total outstanding debt dropped slightly but soon started rising 
again. It currently sits at a record figure of £1.7 trillion with the Office for Budget 
Responsibility predicting a total of £2.5 trillion by 2024/5 along with a steady increase in the 
household debt to income ratio above the current figure of 142 percent (see Harari, 2018; 
OBR, 2019). What’s more, this explosion of outstanding debt is also mirrored around the 
world with many other advanced economies, including the likes of Australia and Canada, 
describing similar trends on their way to even more elevated ratios – 210% and 186% 
respectively (Statista, 2021).  
Most of this private debt, around £1.5 trillion at time of writing, comes from runaway 
mortgage markets and resultant price inflation but underlying the actual distribution is a pro-
consumptive augmentation of economy and society, the different totals and ratios 
representative of activity that is fundamentally debt-dependent, that could not have taken 
place in other circumstances. It represents consumption by postponed payment, cultivating 
participation through growing obligations and widening debt-to-income ratios, which, in a 
context of falling profitability, slow growth, declining incomes and occupational insecurity, 
ties the individual and the collective ever more closely into a suite of speculative and deeply 
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contingent assumptions about the future of consumer societies, subjective identification and 
western capitalism. To understand where these assumptions come from and why they might 
be problematic for insecure worker-consumers and indeed the overarching political-economy 
of late capitalism, we first turn to the notably immaterial origins of credit within the banking 
system.   
Futurity of Credit 
When it comes to the wellspring of credit, much of the banking industry, supported by a great 
deal of orthodox economic theory (see Allen and Gale, 2004; Fecht et al, 2008), operates on 
a one-in, one-out, self-equalising assumption in which lenders play little or no active role 
beyond a judicious intermediation that extends no further than redistributing deposits from 
savers to borrowers. This fosters a relatively simple understanding of credit that goes a long 
way to minimising the systemic risks of a growing lending portfolio by suggesting that it is 
roughly analogous to wages and welfare, positing the capacity and desire to lend as a direct 
corollary of already-existing profits. According to Paul Krugman (2012: 147), for example,  
When debt is rising, it’s not the economy as a whole borrowing more money. It is...a case 
of less patient people – people who for whatever reason want to spend sooner rather 
than later – borrowing from more patient people.   
The prevailing neoliberal explanation for the origins of credit relies on a rationalist, risk-averse 
mythology in which successful economic actors deposit their earnings with a banking 
corporation, which then collates deposits and benignly allocates them to the more impatient, 
risk-taking and unfrugal sections of the population with little to no systemic risk. It posits 
banking as a staid, cautious form of financial intermediation, a systematised networking and 
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investment service that fulfils largely the same distributive function as the payment of wages 
by ensuring that material productivity feeds through into aggregate consumption.  
At the core of this ‘intermediary thesis’ is a notional equivalence between material 
productivity and the amount of money available to spend on goods, services and 
accreditations, an assumption that has become decidedly unsustainable since the global 
financial crisis of 2007-08 as the inherent, long-term instability of debt-driven economies has 
hit home. In almost every account of recent economic history (see, for example, Streeck, 
2016) there is an acknowledgement that late capitalism rests upon a deep and expansive 
ocean of debt that spans financial and non-financial enterprise, private households and the 
institutions of government.  
Whilst sovereign authority does not relate to borrowed monies in the same way as a private 
household or a business enterprise – the capacity to issue currency means that states can 
always make payments (Mitchell et al, 2016), ensuring that governments are the only socio-
structural entities unconstrained by revenue – the generalised expansion of debt has 
nonetheless significantly altered the balance of power around the world, especially in some 
of the more finance-dependent economies.  In the United Kingdom, the US, Australia, Canada 
and elsewhere, the decline of late capitalism’s underlying rate of profit has drawn political 
authority into a notably ‘econocratic’ frame (see Earle et al, 2017), cultivating an increasingly 
technocratic obsession with continued growth as other policy considerations gave way to 
fiscal consolidation and socioeconomic financialization.  
What this has produced, Mazzucato (2018) argues, is a fundamentally recalibrated capitalism 
that has largely handed off the messy, complicated business of production to a host of vassal 
producer nations, turning instead to a combination of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate – 
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the ‘FIRE sector’ (see Mitchell and Fazi, 2017) – along with the possibility of augmenting 
growth by artificially enhancing the availability of payment means and attaching additional 
costs to production and consumption by charging ‘interest’. Whether credit cards, student 
loans, mortgages or anything else, the form of debt doesn’t really matter because it all goes 
into the production of financial assets known as ‘securities’, which have since become the 
primary focal point for a global economy interconnected to an entirely unprecedented extent.  
Historically, western capitalism has had episodes of speculative financing (see Mackay, 2018), 
perhaps most notably prior to the Wall Street Crash of 1929, but the current iteration is far 
more expansive in scale (Varoufakis, 2011). In the historical example, the financial 
relationships were broadly comparable but limited to the continental United States and a 
marked over-valuation of stocks on the New York exchange (Galbraith, 2009), which pulled 
the rest of the world into the Great Depression as the collapse of the American economy 
reduced outward investment.  
What’s different today is that huge swaths of the world economy are implicated at source, 
from the western heartlands of the neoliberal imagination to the tiger economies of the far 
east, all have been pulled into a singular global system that, according to Varoufakis (2011), 
turned global capital distribution on its head towards the end of the last century. Instead of 
investment flowing outwards from the ‘advanced’ – meaning ‘financialised’ – economies, it 
rushes inwards as productive nations look to recycle their capital surplus into the FIRE sector. 
It’s hardly remarkable to note that Chinese investors, for example, own vast tracts of property 
and other financial assets in the US, the UK and Australia – recent totals run to $1 trillion, 
£143 billion and A$80 billion respectively – but the reality is that this has combined the various 
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sections of the world economy into a single, deeply unstable entity centred on the payment 
obligations attached to western debts.       
This leaves us with a couple of questions. Where do all these ‘financial assets’, typically in the 
form of payment obligations attached to debts, come from? Are they, as neoliberal thinkers 
like Krugman typically assert, merely the product of a relatively simple, rational intermediary 
function or is there something a bit more ephemeral at play? 
Several different theorists, often working in and around the development of Modern 
Monetary Theory (see, for example, Mitchell et al, 2016), have returned to competing 
explanations hastily dismissed by the neoliberal orthodoxies of the late twentieth century in 
search of the practical origins of credit-based expansion, predatory lending and widespread 
mismanagement of systemic risks. What they’ve settled on is an idea that originally appeared 
in the works of Marx (1991 [1891]) and Macleod (2012 [1891]) before reaching its zenith with 
Schumpeter’s (2008 [1934]) assertion that the ‘kernel of the credit phenomenon’ is an act of 
creation, an illusory, ‘fictitious’ acceleration of the ‘social stream’ that is, more often than not, 
altogether lacking in material basis.  
From this perspective, credit is less judicious recirculation of existing funds than a purposeful 
creation of payment means entirely distinct from material value, conjured into existence at 
the point of application to fulfil a request for payment. When a receptive institution is 
presented with a potentially profitable lending opportunity – anything from a mortgage or a 
business proposal down to a short-term ‘payday’ loan – it doles out the ability to pay by 
buying an IOU from the borrower and so staking a contractual claim on their future income. 
It is an act of creation, a click-of-the-fingers magical appearance worthy of David Copperfield, 
which, as Werner (2014: 16) has it, effectively creates money “as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the 
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banks out of thin air”, that only acquires a degree of materiality when – read, ‘if’ – the 
repayments roll in.  
The difference between these two explanations ultimately boils down to the direction of the 
monetary transfer within a creditor-debtor relationship. Where the intermediary thesis 
minimises the “link between lending and the amount of money in the economy” (Keen, 2017: 
76), positioning the borrower as a beneficiary of the hard work and diligence of others, the 
creation thesis turns that relationship on its head, suggesting that the banking system, in 
relation to its lending activities at least, works by cultivating contractual payment obligations 
expected to mature at a more or less specific point in the future. The former makes some 
logical sense because it compresses the complexities of the international finance industry into 
a simple relationship roughly analogous to one person lending a small amount to another but 
it cannot explain where banking institutions find trillions of Pounds and Dollars and Euros to 
farm into property markets or how western capitalism has allowed consumers to spend in 
excess of the value of their national economies alongside incomes that have, with few 
exceptions, been stagnant for decades (Streeck, 2016), at least in light of the rising cost of 
living.  
This only works if the monetary relationship is reversed, allowing the lending party to claim a 
promise of future payment as actual corporate value in the present, conjuring payment 
means out of the ether by contractually reaching forward into the future to siphon off the 
prospective value of imminent labour. When a loan is made, it’s drawn not from existing 
resources – there are no forklift trucks beneath the Bank of England or piles of cash and 
precious metals moving from one vault to another – and instead represents a fundamentally 
optimistic assumption about years and decades to come, ensuring that its value remains 
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notional and speculative until the loan matures. Credit acts as a promise of payment in a 
distant and unpredictable future, which requires both the lender and the borrower to 
estimate the inherently inestimable, exposing self and system to a compounding form of 
temporal uncertainty by gambling on debtors’ future income (Lazzarato, 2012).  
The result is a monetary system that allows us to exceed the present by capitalising the future, 
turning consumer participation, especially in the context of depressed labour markets and 
falling incomes, into a function of nominalised value (Palan, 2015) in which the money we 
spend ultimately emerges from shared, often implicit assumptions about the future of 
capitalism. This inherent futurity goes a long way to bridging the gap between relatively 
constrained material circumstances and the parallel explosion of desirable symbolic objects, 
experiences and accreditations, ensuring that the ‘flawed consumers’ of late-capitalism’s 
contractive phase remain partially and incompletely invested in the system, albeit at the 
expense of a growing balance of payments.  
Where the intermediary understanding of credit allows for the comforting illusion that 
consumer capitalism is in rude health, acknowledging that its current disposition rests on the 
insubstantial foundations of a speculative lien on uncertain futures suggests a different 
direction. It ties mass indebtedness into one of late capitalism’s most remarkable structural 
dimensions, it’s capacity to sustain a relatively accelerated level of consumer participation 
alongside the systemic entropy of stagnation and decline, growing division and unrest 
(Streeck, 2016; see also, Celik, 2016).  
It has allowed consumer capitalism to perpetually stave off the consequences of several 
fundamental problems, temporarily displacing them by turning to a kind of systemic cheating 
that keeps a sizeable portion of the western population consuming beyond otherwise falling 
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incomes. Inevitably, the nature of this ‘cheating’ is open to a level of interpretation but it is 
nonetheless inextricable from the wellspring of credit within the banking system and the 
resultant capacity to step over the insufficiencies of the present by drawing a semblance of 
vitality from uncertain futures.  
We might live in disordered and tumultuous times, but consumer capitalism continues to spin 
outwards more or less regardless of deteriorating material circumstances because the 
capacity to manufacture all but unlimited payment means colonises the unreal through a form 
of financially mediated dissociation. It bridges the growing chasm between how large parts of 
the western population actually live and the material foundations of consumer lifestyles – as 
an example, ONS (2016) data suggests that around 35% of the UK population carry a growing 
and long-standing obligation to future payments – allowing both the individual and the 
surrounding social order to exceed the latter and so keep the perpetually impending 
dissolution of late capitalism at arm’s length. In the final section of this paper, we want to 
push a bit further into this relationship to consider why borrowed means of payment might 
appeal to insecure worker-consumers with undependable incomes.  
 
The promise of future satisfaction 
Whilst some aspects of the burgeoning, albeit relatively small, sociology of mass indebtedness  
arguably skirt the margins of immateriality whilst acknowledging both the temporality and 
the inherent risks (see, for example, Adkins, 2017; Sparkes, 2019) we contend that the out-
of-the-ether quality of credit creation is vital if we’re to grapple effectively with the inverse 
correlation between capitalism’s declining rate of profit and the ongoing proliferation of 
outstanding payment obligations. Throughout our previous research (Horsley, 2015; Lloyd,  
2018; Horsley & Lloyd, 2020), we have explored the lives of low-paid and insecure workers as 
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well as those of people struggling with problem debt, frequently touching upon the 
relationship between credit and consumer culture. It should be noted immediately that 
attitudes towards credit and debt vary enormously making generalisations problematic but, 
at the junction of our overlapping interests, there is a definite sense in which borrowed 
payment means mediate and extend insecure worker-consumer’s connection to a distinctly 
unproductive capitalism that has spent much of the last few decades lurching from one 
narrowly and incompletely averted disaster to another.  
Personal and systemic indebtedness has become an omnipresent aspect of late capitalism, 
funding much of our consumer society (Bauman, 2007), debt-driving its values and ideologies 
by drawing means of payment from prospective futures on the strength of contractual 
obligations. At every level of consumer markets, debt is an all but unavoidable presence, from 
the upper reaches of the mortgage market and high-end luxury consumption down to the 
growing presence of payday lenders and rent-to-buy shops in many towns and cities (see 
Rowlingson et al, 2016); it’s possible to borrow at any time for almost any reason.  
Credit provides the raw pecuniary means to consume and to be seen to consume. It is the 
mechanism by which we construct and deconstruct lifestyles and identities based on a 
plethora of commodities pregnant with symbolic power, predicated on the subjective pursuit 
of satisfaction. It is the means by which the otherwise dislocated inhabitants of late modernity 
partake in capitalism’s fundamental fantasy of autonomous subjectivity (Johnston, 2008), 
tethering the self to a suite of contractual payment obligations in exchange for the illusion of 
freedom and sovereignty in the present.  
If we’re to understand the vibrancy of consumer markets and their connection to late 
capitalism’s ongoing decline, the process of ‘credit creation’, as opposed to ‘allocation’ is vital. 
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Making a living is getting harder, incomes are stagnant or in decline and everyday life is 
overshadowed by uncertainty but the vast majority, as Streeck (2016) remarks, continue to 
discharge their distributive obligations by drawing payment means from uncertain futures. In 
the process, late capitalism has partially and unsteadily bridged a chasm that it might 
otherwise have fallen into, sustaining and harnessing libidinal energies against the inexorable 
decline of its productive capacities. The continued expansion of outstanding debt maintains 
the integration of capitalism into everyday life by allowing it to step over its internal 
contradictions, forging an economically productive, socially preservative pathway towards 
otherwise foreclosed satisfactions.  
The proliferation of lending mechanisms ties capitalism into day-to-day life, tapping into a 
torrent of speculative largesse that overwhelms relative structural incapacity to bind 
subjective consumer experience – aspiration, desire, hope and enjoyment – to a promise of 
future payment. We might even say that debt subjectivises capitalism, reducing the infinite 
possibilities of the future to a kind of cyberpunk aesthetic in which, regardless of internal and 
external pressures, existing pecuniary conditions remain inviolate as the creditor-debtor 
relationship spins outwards, contractual payment obligations compounding over years and 
decades. In some ways, as Lazzarato (2012) argues, this perhaps amounts to a measure of 
‘control’ to the extent that it funnels debtors’ behaviours, orientations and decision-making 
capacities into the necessity of making payments, cultivating a longstanding relationship that 
goes a long way to enforcing the prevailing accumulation regime.  
With a slight shift in emphasis, however, we can take this idea a little further, stepping out of 
a relatively monotone reference to ‘control’, ‘enforcement’ and ‘obligation’ to better reflect 
the fundamental relations of late-modern political economy. The capacity to borrow money 
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also functions as a condition of possibility in otherwise stagnant and illiquid consumer 
economies. Late capitalism appears to be immune to the resultant deflationary pressures 
because it routinely deploys lending mechanisms to sustain consumerism’s promise against 
the general decline of its prevailing structural conditions. We might think of this promise as 
the basis of modern capitalism, the starting point for its seemingly endless supply of 
subjective enticements centred on the idea that ‘your life will be better if/when…’ as it 
perpetually cultivates dissatisfaction with the present only to hold out a means of 
transcendence commonly attached to the substantive and/or symbolic value of a particular 
product, accreditation or experience (see McGowan, 2016; see also Ward, 2017).  
Debt-generating payment means allows us to keep skipping from one fleeting, ultimately 
unfulfilling gratification to the next whilst avoiding the pitfalls of relative incapacity, 
continually reinvesting the self in the promise of improved conditions, material prosperity, 
status and the acquisition of ‘stuff’ against the underlying decline of incomes and general 
absence of secure employment. If credit has an ideological function, it’s to redouble 
capitalism’s mystification of social reality, allowing it to transcend its limitations by 
speculatively siphoning payment means from ultimately unknowable futures whilst ensuring 
that the worker-consumer remains “situated within the narrative” (Pfaller, 2014: 67) of an 
otherwise failing system.  
It's here that we might adapt Bauman’s (2005) description of ‘flawed consumers’ because the 
availability of credit since the mid-90s has gone a long way to splitting the logical relationship 
between relative incapacity and reduced potential, allowing the debtor-consumer, as well as 
consumer capitalism itself, to transcend limitations, separating expansion from distribution 
through a peculiar kind of generative largesse. Whilst there are many different examples of 
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this largesse at work, often spanning the breadth of the global economy – we might point to 
the growing availability of unsecured and minimally risk-managed consumer credit with, for 
instance, the recent proliferation of ‘Buy Now, Pay Later’ (BNPL) companies such as Klarna, 
the return on very low interest mortgages in the UK or the rapid expansion of crypto-
currencies – the important point for our purposes is that individual and collective 
consumptive potential is only partially determined by income and employment and that 
consumer capitalism has found a way of bolstering participation against any and all 
constraints by speculatively advancing the payment means to maintain the Sisyphean pursuit 
of future satisfaction.  
Without the availability of credit, a great many active, engaged consumers would almost 
certainly struggle to maintain their allegiance to late-capitalism’s promise of future 
satisfaction, finding their pursuit of goods, property, experiences and accreditations stymied 
by the absence of payment means. Access to credit, functioning as a condition of possibility, 
goes a long way to maintaining the affective rituals of socio-symbolic consumption by 
circumnavigating the material limits of insecure work, low-pay and underemployment. In 
place of concrete mechanisms that fund participation through material circulation, late 
capitalism has opted instead for a kind of long-run gambling, an immaterial relation that 
funnels the general population into a speculative orientation to the future, negating limits to 
expansion whilst maintaining the allure of prevailing cultural imperatives.  
Where material constraints might otherwise push the subject outwards, excluding them from 
active participation in the marketplace, the proliferation of lending mechanisms provides a 
means of consuming over and above income and so continuing to engage with the endlessly 
rotating pursuit of satisfaction that acts as the primary socio-symbolic marker of lifestyle and 
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identity. There is a definite sense in which late capitalism’s cultural imperatives rely 
substantially on a suite of mutually reinforcing socioeconomic relations to the extent that 
everyday life increasingly oscillates between transcendence and dissatisfaction, between the 
lending mechanisms that sustain participation and the debts that tie us into pressures of 
growing payment obligations on top of income constraints (Day, 2019), often necessitating 
yet greater reliance on borrowed monies. 
We’re living in an era of near-constant labour market ‘restructuring’, decimated labour laws, 
on-demand employment and extractive regulatory frameworks but the availability of credit 
functions, at least in the short term, to maintain the monetary foundations of consumer 
culture’s integral fantasies – autonomy, beauty, pleasure and self-fulfilment – harnessing 
their libidinal energies to the continued health of the system (Hall, 2012; Horsley et al, 2015). 
The capacity to borrow money provides the basic pecuniary wherewithal for the continual re-
seduction of the consuming subject, casting their sense of self forward into a realm of 
potentiality by supplying payment means beyond the reduced productivity of post-industrial 
capitalism. 
Whether we fix our gaze on the individual consumer or the wider system, it’s increasingly 
difficult to avoid the suspicion that there is something fundamentally Panglossian about the 
way we live today, a kind of negative optimism in which we are individually and collectively 
gambling the integrity of self and society on late capitalism’s ongoing capacity to repeatedly 
overcome the long-running decline of its base rate of profit. In relying quite so heavily on 
debt-generated means of payment, we are almost literally living on the assumption that late 
capitalism not only has a future but that it will somehow come good, allowing us to repay our 
debts by returning to the kind of stable, protected and functionally distributive growth model 
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that began to dissolve under a range of internal and external pressures more than fifty years 
ago.  
If we’re to understand the connection between a relatively healthy form of consumer 
capitalism and the generalised return to a model of political and economic development that 
apparently views human bodies, let alone meaningful lives, as an unnecessary expense to be 
minimised through ongoing welfare retrenchment, continued wage stagnation and the 
increased scope for cross-industry automation provided by artificial intelligence, a full social-
scientific accounting is crucial. It is credit and debt that provide the traction point for a 21st 
century sociology that fully appreciates the growing disconnect between vibrant consumer 
markets and overarching political-economic trajectories that seem to be feeding through into 
near-Victorian levels of social inequality and mass resentment (Polsky, 2015). We might be 
living in a profoundly entropic age with security of life and livelihood rapidly trending to zero 
but, for the moment at least, a large part of the population appears to be maintaining a 
semblance of ‘social inclusion’ by reaching over the horizon to keep consuming in otherwise 
precarious times. 
This is the primary function of credit. It opens a more or less direct financial pathway into an 
ethical gesture known as ‘fetishistic disavowal’ (Žižek, 2008), allowing us to individually and 
collectively repress uncomfortable or inconvenient knowledge within a form of ideological 
cynicism, deadening its effects. In the context of stagnant or falling incomes and increasingly 
undependable employment structures, we might realise that an unexpected expense could 
carry us beyond our finances, that the next desirable something would be a step too far or 
that any marginal change of circumstance will leave us facing penury. Credit allows us to push 
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any such fears, no matter how realistic, to one side and press on down an economically and 
culturally preservative path of least resistance.  
Where the alternative would often be a kind of hard stop or a conscious withdrawal, credit 
dilutes the effects of post-industrial capitalism’s socio-structural entropy, allowing its 
subjects, individually and collectively, to maintain our place in the established order of things. 
It provides a means of indulgence but also a means of general sustenance, stepping over the 
insufficiencies of the present to preserve the symbolic rituals of a consumer society even as 
an increasingly pervasive form of generalised insecurity rises upwards from the tattered 
remnants of the industrial ‘working class’ into what were, until recently, fairly secure ‘middle 
class’ professions. It does this by breaking consumer spending, not to mention capitalism 
itself, out of any dialectical relationship with the material world, separating it off from 
productivity, investment and profitability, cutting away any associated restrictions on the 
money supply, in favour of almost unlimited liquidity attached to an unchecked proliferation 
of “virtual traction point[s]” (Dupuy, 2014: 16) – nominal repayment points – located at some 
loosely specified point in the future hidden from view by a suite of temporal uncertainties.  
We might be even tempted by Keen’s (2017: 95) suggestion that many of the world’s 
developed economies, with particular emphasis on the heartlands of the neoliberal 
imagination, have become ‘debt zombies’, a “walking dead of debt” that produce little whilst 
nonetheless absorbing resources at an accelerating rate, depleting the future ahead of time 
to sustain a modicum of consumption in the present. Within these distinctly extractive 
political and economic conditions, cultural participation is fundamentally compromised 
because it becomes an effect rather than a cause, an after-market reflection of generative 
excess caught up in a generalised form of immaterial speculation that continues to inflate 
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nominal values whilst pushing the current form of capitalism further beyond the structural, 
fiscal and environmental limits of expansion.  
Whilst much of consumer culture’s appeal rests on a prevailing ideological fantasy that 
McGowan (2016) characterises as ‘more and better’, its pursuit commonly and perhaps 
increasingly rests upon a level of dissociation, a substantive and ideological disconnect 
between the surface relief of enjoyable goods, experiences and accreditations and the 
underlying contradictions of a stagnant, illiquid and deeply unproductive capitalism partially 
and incompletely bridged by generative largesse. It’s a distinctly undialectical relationship, a 
deadening of the connection between culture and economy in which the former continues 
unabated whilst the latter falls into an increasingly advanced state of disrepair, allowing 
consumer lifestyles to outpace their material foundations and for the accretion of a distinctly 
dissociative and ‘unreal’ subjective experience built upon a form of generalised speculation. 
It's even possible to see this disconnect in action in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, 
late capitalism deploying its generative capacity to minimise the disruption of lockdowns, 
furlough schemes and mass redundancies, sustaining popular ideological allegiance to an 
otherwise failing system allowing the existing order of things to continue unabated even as 
the underlying decline gathers pace. Whether it’s the financial crash of 2008 or the ongoing 
ramifications of Covid-19, Briggs et al (2020) note, major crises tend to focus attention on the 
flaws of an increasingly highly-strung socio-economic form, magnifying prevailing frustrations 
and resentments, only to give way to a readopted and restated system normal as the 
speculative bridging mechanism kicks into gear, facilitating the process of disavowal and 
dissociation. In so doing, the capacity to artificially manufacture payment means, separating 
22 
 
value from materiality, takes on a distinctly preservative ideological function, allowing late 
capitalism to maintain the allure of its fundamental fantasy.  
Looking toward the future, the financial relationships explored here are but one aspect of a 
deeply entropic system that looks to be coming toward the end of its existing ‘accumulation 
cycle’ – a relatively settled period in which production and trade expand rapidly before 
exhausting their vital context (see Mitchell and Fazi, 2017) – as distributive structures break 
down and real wealth coalesces in the hands of relatively few, magnifying a wide array of 
grievances and resentments (Deneen, 2016). With its armoury of speculative bridging 
mechanisms, credit-based expansion has undoubtedly kept the neoliberal regime ticking over 
far beyond the raw productivity of late 20th century economic models, but it has also created 
a problem that any subsequent regime, including a revived ‘green’ capitalism or a ‘great reset’ 
(see Schwab and Malleret, 2020), will need to neutralise or otherwise circumnavigate.     
With the explosion of debt at all levels of economy and society over the last few decades – 
mid-2020 figures (see Schwab and Vanham, 2021) suggest that the total outstanding debt sits 
at almost $260 trillion worldwide, or roughly three times the notional value of the world 
economy – late capitalism has created a void, an array of speculative, un-resourced payment 
obligations that all but prevent the formation of a new accumulation regime. Just as 
generative largesse bolsters demand by creating money, as Keen (2017: 115) puts it, “net debt 
repayment destroys money and subtracts from demand”, which, in turn, further reduces 
economic activity, effectively trapping debt-based economies into a long-lasting structural 
depression. 
One way or another, late capitalism is heading for a reckoning – generative largesse is only a 
stop-gap measure, it keeps the party going by adding the eventual hangover whilst any kind 
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of managed re-materialisation ultimately leads to the same result, a deep and enduring 
structural crisis. It’s impossible to know exactly what the future holds but, according to 
modern monetary theory, there’s only one possible escape vector – a massive and sustained 
acceleration of public spending accompanied by a concomitant recalibration of capital 
distribution mechanisms. It’s perhaps for this reason that ongoing debates around economic 
renewal typically give serious consideration to reducing the burden of private debt by directly 
employing the sovereign capacity to exceed revenue. 
The idea of Universal Basic Income, a ‘job guarantee’ (see Mitchell and Fazi, 2017: 225-30 for 
discussion), Mazzucato’s (2021) assertion that governments should shape markets and 
Kelton’s (2021) concomitant emphasis on fiscal policy, all suggest renewed interest in 
sovereign authority’s distributive function. Unfortunately, such a marked structural 
transformation, as Deneen (2018) notes, is likely to require reserves of political and cultural 
capital unavailable to current liberal democracies, most of which have spent the last decade 
or more mired in distinct but interconnected legitimation crises marked by growing cynicism 
and disaffection, structural dysfunction and civic disconnection. 
 
Conclusion  
We began this paper with the observation that consumer capitalism has more or less 
succeeded in separating income from expenditure, allowing for the continued expansion of 
consumer markets and lifestyles despite the long-term decline of material circumstances 
denoted, as much as anything, by the emergence of ‘gig economies’ and the proliferation of 
insecure and low-paid employment. In this context, we set out to explore the tension 
between consumer culture’s endless solicitations and the emergence of increasingly insecure 
and undependable labour markets alongside the proliferation of immaterial means of 
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payment with the goal of exploring the substantive and ideological function of the latter 
within an otherwise stagnant and illiquid form of capitalism.   
To explain this idea, we turned to economic theory and specifically to the inherent 
immateriality of the credit creation process, a broad-based capacity to conjure payment 
means out of the ether, artificially accelerating economy and society through a kind of 
‘systemic cheating’ that perpetually staves off many of the subjective consequences of an 
otherwise failing socio-structural form. Where the banking industry, orthodox economics and 
political policy generally cleave to a mythology of cautious probity in which lending is funded 
by savings, the reality, we noted, is rather more risk laden and ultimately amounts to placing 
a speculative lien on the future through the proliferation of contractual payment obligations. 
This, we suggested, keeps the perpetually impending dissolution of late capitalism at arm’s 
length, stepping over present insufficiencies by capitalising the future ahead of time in a way 
that is utterly inextricable from the wellspring of credit-based payment means within the 
banking system.  
This, we argued, is the structural and ideological function of credit. It serves to facilitate and 
maintain subjective engagement within an otherwise failing system, tying the individual to 
the established order of things by going some way to fulfilling the integral promise of 
consumer culture. It offers a culturally, socially and economically participatory way of 
escaping or transcending dissatisfaction by securing immediate spending against future 
earnings, ensuring that hopes and expectations filter through the creditor-debtor relationship 
rather than roaming outwards where they might encounter and internalise the possibility of 
meaningful structural change. In so doing, it has inducted consumers into a suite of 
speculative relations encompassing income, employment and means of payment in which a 
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large and growing section of the population only maintain participation by gambling on late-
capitalism’s ultimate prospects, artificially fuelling the processes of socio-symbolic 
competition at the heart of consumer lifestyle projects, carrying them beyond the material 
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